Abstract: An Identity-based encryption (IBE) simplifies key management by taking users' identities as public keys. However, how to dynamically revoke users in an IBE scheme is not a trivial problem. To solve this problem, IBE scheme with revocation (namely revocable IBE scheme) has been proposed. Apart from those lattice-based IBE, most of the existing schemes are based on decisional assumptions over pairing-groups. In this paper, we propose a revocable IBE scheme based on a weaker assumption, namely Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption over non-pairing groups. Our revocable IBE scheme is inspired by the IBE scheme proposed by Döttling and Garg in Crypto2017. Like Döttling and Garg's IBE scheme, the key authority maintains a complete binary tree where every user is assigned to a leaf node. To adapt such an IBE scheme to a revocable IBE, we update the nodes along the paths of the revoked users in each time slot. Upon this updating, all revoked users are forced to be equipped with new encryption keys but without decryption keys, thus they are unable to perform decryption any more. We prove that our revocable IBE is adaptive IND-ID-CPA secure in the standard model. Our scheme serves as the first revocable IBE scheme from the CDH assumption. Moreover, we extend our scheme to support Decryption Key Exposure Resistance (DKER) and also propose a server-aided revocable IBE to decrease the decryption workload of the receiver. In our schemes, the size of updating key in each time slot is only related to the number of newly revoked users in the past time slot.
Introduction
The concept of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) was proposed by Shamir [1] in 1984. In an IBE scheme, the public key of a user can simply be the identity id of the user, like name, email address, etc. An IBE scheme considers three parties: key authority, sender and receiver. The key authority is in charge of generating secret key sk id for user id. A sender simply encrypts plaintexts under the receiver's identity id and the receiver uses his own secret key sk id for decryption. With IBE, there is no need for senders to ask for authenticated public keys from Public-Key Infrastructures, hence key management is greatly simplified.
Over the years, there have been many IBE schemes proposed from various assumptions in the standard model. Most of the assumptions are decisional ones, like the bilinear Diffie-Hellman
1.
Weaker security assumption. The securities of our RIBE and SR-IBE schemes can be reduced to the CDH assumption. Hence our schemes serve as the first RIBE/SR-IBE schemes from the CDH assumption over non-pairing groups. More precisely, our first RIBE scheme can achieve adaptive-IND-ID-CPA security but without the property of decryption key exposure resistance(DKER). Our second RIBE scheme obtains decryption key exposure resistance but with selective-IND-ID-CPA security. Our SR-IBE scheme is selective-SR-ID-CPA secure. The securities of the three schemes can be reduced to the CDH assumption.
2.
Smaller size of key updating. When a time slot begins, the key updating algorithm of our RIBE/SR-IBE will issue updating keys whose size is only linear to the number of newly revoked users in the past time slot. In comparison, most of the existing RIBE/SR-IBE schemes have to update keys whose number is related to the number of all revoked users across all the previous time slots.
In Table 1 , we compare our RIBE scheme with some existing RIBE schemes. Table 1 . Comparison with RIBE schemes (in the standard model). Here N is the total number of users, r is the number of all revoked users and ∆r is the number of newly revoked users the past time slot. DKER means decryption key exposure resistance. Remark 1. Döttling and Garg's IBE makes use of garbled circuits to implement the underlying cryptographic primitives. Hence it is prohibitive in terms of efficiency. Our RIBE inherits their idea, hence the efficiency of our RIBE scheme is also incomparable to the RIBE schemes from bilinear maps. However, since no RIBE scheme is available from the CDH assumption over non-pairing groups, our scheme serves as a theoretical exploration in the field of RIBE.
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Paper Organization
In Section 2, we collect notations and some basic definitions used in the paper and present the framework. We illustrate our idea of RIBE in Section 3. In Section 4, we construct a revocable IBE scheme (without DKER) based on the CDH assumption and present the correctness and security analysis of the scheme. Then we show how to make our RIBE to obtain DKER in Section 5. In Section 6, we provide a SR-IBE scheme from the CDH assumption. In Section 7, we illustrate the key updating complexity analysis of our scheme.
Preliminaries
Notations
The security parameter is denoted by λ. "probabilistic polynomial-time" is abbreviated by "PPT". Let n, a and b be integers. Denote by [n] the set {1, · · · , n}, by [a, b] the set {a, a + 1, · · · , b}, by {0, 1} * the set of bit-strings of arbitrary length, and by {0, 1} ≤ the set of bit-strings of length at most . Let ε be an empty string. and |v| be the bit-length of string v. Obviously, |ε| = 0. Denote by x||y the concatenation of two bit-strings x and y, by x i the i-th bit of x, by x $ ← S the process of sampling the element x from the set S uniformly at random, and by a ← X the process of sampling the element a over the distribution X . By a ← f (·) we mean that a is the output of a function f . A function negl : N → R is negligible if for any polynomial p(λ) it holds that negl(λ) < 1/p(λ) for all sufficiently large λ ∈ N.
outputs a decryption key sk (t) id for time slot t. In formula, sk (t) id ← RIBE.DK(mpk, sk id , KU, t).
• Encryption: This algorithm RIBE.Enc is run by the sender. Given the public key mpk, a public list PL, an identity id, a time slot t and a message m, this algorithm outputs a ciphertext ct. In formula, ct ← RIBE.Enc(mpk, id, t, m, PL).
• Decryption: This algorithm RIBE.Enc is run by the receiver. The algorithm takes as input the master public key mpk, the decryption key sk
id and the ciphertext ct, and outputs a message m or a failure symbol ⊥. In formula, m/⊥ ← RIBE.Dec(mpk, sk
id , ct).
• Revocation: This algorithm RIBE.R is run by the key authority. Given a revoked identity id and the time slot t during which id is revoked and a state st = (KL, PL, RL, KU), this algorithm updates the revocation list RL with RL ← RL ∪ {(id, t)}. It outputs a new state st = (KL, PL, RL, KU).
Correctness. For all (mpk, msk, st) ← RIBE.Setup(1 λ , N), all m ∈ M, all identity id ∈ ID, all time slot t ∈ T , and revocation list RL, for all (sk id , st ) ← RIBE.KG(msk, id, st), st ← RIBE.KU(msk, t, st), and sk
id ← RIBE.DK(mpk, sk id , KU, t), we have RIBE.Dec(mpk, sk
∈ RL(i.e., id is not revoked at time t) and PL ∈ st .
Now we explain how a revocable IBE system works. To setup the system, the key authority invokes RIBE.Setup to generate master public key mpk, master secret key msk and the state st. Then it publishes the public key mpk. When a user registers in the system with identity id, the key authority invokes RIBE.KG(msk, id, st) to generate the private key sk id for user id. If a user id needs to be revoked during time slot t, the key authority invokes RIBE.R(id, t, st). Next it updates the state st. At the beginning of each time slot t, the key authority might invoke RIBE.KU(msk, t, st) to update keys by updating set KU. Then it publishes some information about the updated set KU. Meanwhile it may also publish some public information PL. During time slot t, when a user wants to send a message m to another user id, he/she invokes RIBE.Enc(mpk, id, t, m, PL) to encrypt m to obtain the ciphertext ct, then sends (t, ct) to user id. To decrypt a ciphertext ct encrypted at time t, the receiver id first invokes RIBE.DK(mpk, sk id , KU, t) to generate its own decryption key sk
id of time t. The receiver id invokes RIBE.Dec(mpk, sk (t) id , ct) to decrypt the ciphertext and recover the plaintext.
Remark. In the definition of our RIBE, KL is the key list which stores the essential information used to generate the update key. PL is a public information list which is used in the encryption algorithm. In the traditional definition of RIBE in other works, no PL is defined. However, in our construction, PL will serve as an essential input to the encryption algorithm and that is the reason we define it. Nevertheless, our definition can be regarded as a general one, while the traditional definition of RIBE can be seen as a special case of PL = ∅.
Security. Now we formalize the security of a revocable IBE. We first consider four oracles: private key generation oracle KG(·), key update oracle KU, decryption key generation oracle DK(·, ·) and revocation oracle RVK(·, ·) which are shown in Table 2 . The security of adaptive-IND-ID-CPA defines as follows. 
The experiment has the following requirements for A.
• The two plaintexts submitted by A have the same length, i.e., |M 0 | = |M 1 |. • The time slot t submitted to KU and RVK(·, ·) by A is in ascending order.
•
If the challenger has published KU at time t, then it is not allowed to query oracle RVK(·, t ) with t < t.
If A has queried id * to oracle KG(·), then there must be query (id * , t) to oracle RVK(·) satisfies t < t * , i.e., id * must has been revoked before time t * .
• If id * is not revoked at time t * , DK(·, ·) cannot be queried on (id * , t * ).
A revocable IBE scheme is adaptive-IND-ID-CPA secure (with DKER) if for all PPT adversary A, the following advantage is negligible in the security parameter λ, i.e.,
Remark 2. The security definition without DKER is similarly defined with changing the experiment so that an adversary A is not allowed to make any decryption key reveal query, i.e., A cannot query for the oracle DK(·, ·). 
The requirements for A in this experiment are the same as the requirements in EXP adaptive-IND-ID-CPA A (λ). A revocable IBE scheme is selective-IND-ID-CPA secure (with DKER) if for all PPT adversary A, the following advantage is negligible in the security parameter λ, i.e.,
Selective-IND-ID-CPA security without DKER is defined can be similarly defined by changing the experiment so that an adversary A is not allowed to query for the oracle DK(·, ·).
Server-Aided Revocable Identity-Based Encryption
In a server-aided revocable identity-based encryption scheme [19] , there are four parities and they work as follows (as shown in Figure 1 ):
• Key Authority generates a public key and a secret key for every registered user and issues the secret key to the user and the public key to the server. In each time slot, the key authority delivers a update key list (to revoke users) to the server. • Sender encrypts a message for an identity and a time slot and sends the ciphertext to the server. • Sever combines the update key list and the stored users' public keys to generate the transformation keys in every time slot for all users. When receiving a ciphertext, the server transforms it to a partially decrypted ciphertext using the transformation key corresponding to the receiver's identity and the corresponding time slot. Then it sends the partially decrypted ciphertext to the receiver.
•
Receiver recovers the sender's message from the partially decrypted ciphertext using a decryption key which can be generated by his/her own secret key and the corresponding time slot. Now, we formally define Server-Aided Revocable Identity Based Encryption (SR-IBE) which was first proposed by Qin et al. [19] . A SR-IBE scheme consists of ten PPT algorithms Σ = (Setup, PubKG, KU, TranKG, PrivKG, DK, Enc, Transform, Dec, R). Let Σ.M denote the message space, Σ.I D the identity space and Σ.T the space of time slots.
• Setup: The setup algorithm Setup is run by the key authority. The input of the algorithm is a security parameter λ and a parameter n, which indicates that the maximal number of users is 2 n . id . In formula, tk
id ← TranKG(mpk, pk id , KU (t) ).
• Private Key Generation: The private key generation algorithm PrivKG is run by the key authority. It takes the master secret key msk and an identity id ∈ {0, 1} n as input. The output of this algorithm is the private key sk id on identity id. In formula, sk id ← PrivKG(msk, id).
• Decryption Key Generation: The decryption key generation algorithm DK is run by the receiver. It takes the secret key sk id and a slot t as input. The output of this algorithm is the decryption key
id . In formula, Dk
The encryption algorithm Enc is run by the sender. It takes the master public key mpk, an identity id, a time plot t, a plaintext message m and a public list PL as the input. The output of this algorithm is the ciphertext ct. In formula, ct ← Enc(mpk, id, t, m, PL).
The transformation algorithm transform is run by the server. It takes the master public key mpk, the transformation key tk
id and the ciphertext ct as the input. The output of this algorithm is the partially decrypted ciphertext ct . In formula, ct ← Transform(mpk, tk
The decryption algorithm Dec is run by the receiver. The input of this algorithm consists of the master public key mpk, the decryption key Dk
id and the partially decrypted ciphertext ct . The output of this algorithm is the plaintext m. In formula, m ← Dec(mpk, Dk
The revocation algorithm R is run by the key authority. The input of this algorithm consists of an identity id, a time plot t and a state st. The output of this algorithm is the updated state st . In formula, st ← R(id, t, st).
Correctness.
The correctness requires that for all message m, if the receiver is not revoked at time period t and all parties follow the algorithms above, then we have m ← Dec(mpk, Dk
Security. Now we formalize the security of SR-IBE. We first consider five oracles: public key generation oracle PUBKG(·), key update oracle KU, private key generation oracle PRIVKG(·), decryption key generation oracle DK(·, ·) and revocation oracle RVK(·, ·) which are shown in Table 3 . The selective-SR-ID-CPA security is defined as follows. Table 3 . Five oracles that the adversary of a SR-IBE scheme can query.
PUBKG(id) :
KU :
Definition 3. Let Σ = (Setup, PubKG, KU, TranKG, PrivKG, DK, Enc, Transform, Dec, R) be a server-aided revocable IBE scheme. Below describes an experiment played between a challenger C and a PPT adversary A.
• The two plaintexts submitted by A have the same length, i.e., |m 0 | = |m 1 |. • The time slot t submitted to KU and RVK(·, ·) by A is in ascending order.
•
If A has queried id * to oracle PRIVKG(·), then there must exist a query (id * , t) to oracle RVK(·) satisfying t < t * , i.e., id * must has been revoked before time t * .
A server-aided revocable IBE scheme is selective-SR-ID-CPA secure (with DKER) if for all PPT adversary A, the following advantage is negligible in the security parameter λ, i.e.,
Garbled Circuits
A garbled circuits scheme consists of two PPT algorithms (GCircuit, Eval).
The algorithm GCircuit takes a security parameter λ and a circuit C as input. This algorithm outputs a garbled circuitC and labels {lab w,b } w∈inp(C),b∈{0,1} where each lab w,b ∈ {0, 1} λ . Here inp(C) represents the set [ ] where is the bit-length of the input of the circuit C.
The algorithm Eval takes as input a garbled circuitC and a set of label {lab w,x w } w∈inp(C) , and it outputs y.
Correctness. In a garbled circuit scheme, for any circuit C and an input x ∈ {0, 1} , it holds that
Security. In a garbled circuit scheme, the security means that there is a PPT simulator Sim such that for any C, x and for any PPT adversary A, the following advantage of A is negligible in the security parameter λ:
where (C, {lab w,b } w∈inp(C),b∈{0,1} ) ← GCircuit(1 λ , C).
Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Let (G, g, p) ← GGen(1 λ ) be a group generation algorithm which outputs a cyclic group G of order p and a generator of G. 
Chameleon Encryption
A chameleon encryption scheme has five PPT algorithms CE = (HGen, H, H −1 , HEnc, HDec).
• HGen: The algorithm HGen takes the security parameter λ and a message-length n as input. This algorithm outputs a key k and a trapdoor t.
The algorithm H takes the key k, a message x ∈ {0, 1} n and a randomness r as input. This algorithm outputs a hash value h and the length of h is λ.
The algorithm H −1 takes a trapdoor t, a previously used message x ∈ {0, 1} n , random coins r and a message x ∈ {0, 1} n as input. It outputs r .
• HEnc: The algorithm HEnc takes a key k, a hash value h, an index i ∈ [n], a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * as input. It outputs a ciphertext ct.
• HDec: The algorithm HDec takes a key k, a message x ∈ {0, 1} n , a randomness r and a ciphertext ct as input. It outputs a value m or ⊥.
The chameleon encryption scheme enjoys the following properties:
• Uniformity. For all x, x ∈ {0, 1} n ,if both r and r are chosen uniformly at random, the two distribution H(k, x; r) and H(k, x ; r ) are statistically indistinguishable.
• Trapdoor Collisions. For any x, x ∈ {0, 1} n and r, if (k, t) ← HGen(1 λ , n) and r ← H −1 (t, (x, r), x ), then it holds that H(k, x; r) = H(k, x ; r ). Moreover, if r is chosen uniformly and randomly, r is statistically close to uniform.
For a PPT adversary A against a chameleon encryption, consider the following experiment:
The security of a chameleon encryption defines as follows: For any PPT adversary A, the advantage of A in experiment EXP
In [8] , such a chameleon encryption was constructed from the CDH assumption.
Idea of Our Revocable IBE Scheme
Idea of the DG Scheme
In the IBE scheme [8] proposed by Döttling and Garg, say the DG scheme, each id is an n-bit binary string. In other words, each user can be regarded as a leaf of a complete binary tree of depth n, which is the length of a user's identity id. For each level j ∈ [n] in the tree, the key authority generates a pair of chameleon encryption key and trapdoor (k j , td j ). As shown in Figure 2 , a leaf v is attached with a key pair (ek v , dk v ), which is the public/secret key of an IND-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme PKE=(G, E, D), i.e., (ek v , dk v ) ← G(1 λ ). In addition, a non-leaf node v in the tree is attached with four values: the hash value h v of this node, the hash value h v||0 of the left child node, the hash value h v||1 of the right child node, a randomness r such that
The master public key of IBE is given by the hash keys (k 0 , . . . , k n−1 ) and the hash value h ε of the root. The master secret key is the seed of a pseudorandom function to generate r v and the trapdoors of the chameleon encryption.
Key Generation. Each user is assigned to a leaf in the tree according to id. The secret key is just all the values attached to those nodes on the path from the root to the leaf. For example, in Figure 2 , if id = 010, then the secret key is sk 010 = ({h ε , h 0 , h 1 , r ε }, {h 0 , h 00 , h 01 , r 0 }, {h 01 , ek 010 , ek 011 , r 01 }, dk 010 ).
Encryption. As for encryption, two kinds of circuits are defined.
(1) Q[m](ek) is a circuit with m hardwired and its input is ek. It computes and outputs the PKE ciphertext of message m under the public-key ek.
is a circuit which hardwires bit β, key k and a serial of labels lab.
It computes and outputs {HEnc(k,
, where lab is the short for
To encrypt a message m under id, the sender generates a series of garbled circuits from the bottom to the top. Specifically, for level n, it generatesQ, the garbled circuit of Q[m], and the corresponding label lab, i.e., (Q,
Then, id n , k n−1 and lab are hardwired into circuit
Repeat this procedure and we have (P 0 Decryption. The decryption goes from the top to bottom. It will invoke the evaluation algorithm Eval of the garbled circuits to obtain chameleon encryption of labels, and uses the secret key of chameleon encryption scheme to recover the corresponding label. For the leaf, it will use the decryption algorithm of PKE to recover the message m.
Idea of Our Revoked IBE Scheme
Our revocable IBE is based on the original DG scheme. An important observation of the DG scheme is that among all the elements in the secret key sk id = ({h v , h v||0 , h v||1 , r v } v∈V , dk id ) of user id, dk id is the most critical element. Recall that V = {ε, id [1] , id [12] , . . . , id[12 . . . n − 1]} and dk id is the decryption key of the underlying building block PKE. The sibling of leaf id knows everything about sk id except dk id . This gives us a hint for revocation. To revoke user id, we can change the decryption key dk id in sk id into a new one dk id and this fresh decryption key will not issued to the revoked user id. As long as the essential element dk id is missing, user id will not be able to decrypt anything. Now we outline how the revocable IBE works.
The tree is updated according to the revoked users.
• If a leaf v id is revoked during time period t, then a new public/secret key pair will generated with (ek id , dk id ) ← G(1 λ ) for this leaf. As a result, h v id = ek id is replaced with a fresh value h (t)
This fresh value will not consistent to what the father node of v id has. Therefore, we have to change the attachments of all nodes along the path from the revoked leaf v id to root bottom upward.
is not defined, where b ∈ {0, 1}.
In this way, a new tree is built with root attached with new value (h
ε ). Please Please note that the hash keys (k 0 , . . . , k n−1 ) remain unchanged.
When revocation happens, what a sender does is updating the new hash value h (t) ε , then invoking the encryption algorithm for encryption.
For decryption to go smoothly, the IBE system has to issue updating keys to users. The updating key includes all the information of the nodes on the paths from revoked leaves to the root, but the new dk
id is not issued. In Figure 3 , for example, two users, namely 000 and 010, are revoked and determine two paths. Then all the nodes along the two paths are marked with cross.
All the nodes are updated with new attachments, but leaf 000 is only attached with a new ek Any legal user is able to update his secret key sk id with the new attachments of nodes along the path from his leaf to the root. For example, the updated secret key sk (t) 001 of user 001 is now {ε, (h In this way, any legal user is able to decrypt ciphertexts since he knows the secret key corresponding to the new tree. Any revoked user id is unable to implement decryption anymore, since the new dk
id is missing.
Revocable IBE Scheme
In this section, we present our construction of revocable IBE scheme from chameleon encryption (without DKER). Let PRF: {0, 1} λ × {0, 1} ≤ +n ∪ {ε} → {0, 1} λ be a pseudorandom function. Let CE = (HGen, We first introduce five subroutines which will be used repeatedly in our scheme (as shown in Table 4 ). All of these five subroutines are run by the key authority. The subroutines NodeGen and LeafGen are invoked by the key authority in setup algorithm, where NodeGen is used to generate non-leaf nodes and LeafGen to generate leaves and their parents. Just like [8] , given all chameleon keys, trapdoors, a randomness s, a node v and a length parameter , the NodeGen subroutine generates four values stored in node v: the hash value of the node h v , the hash value of it left-child node h v||0 , the hash value of it right-child node h v||1 , and the randomness of this node r v . Given all chameleon keys k n−1 and trapdoors td n−1 of the n − 1-th level, a randomness s, a node v in the n − 1-th level and a length parameter , the LeafGen subroutine generates two pairs of public/secret keys (ek v||0 , dk v||0 ), (ek v||1 , dk v||1 ) of the PKE scheme, and generates the hash value h v and the randomness r v of the node v. The children of v are two leaves associated by ek v||0 and ek v||1 . Each user can be uniquely represented by a leaf node. The subroutine FindNodes, subroutine NodeChange and subroutine LeafChange are invoked by the key authority in key update algorithm. Given a revocation list RL, a time t and the global key list KL, subroutine FindNodes(RL, t, KL) outputs all leaves which are revoked at time t and all their ancestor nodes. Given a chameleon key, a chameleon trapdoor, a node v, two hash values (h v||0 , h v||0 ) of the two children of node v and a randomness s, subroutine NodeChange outputs a new hash value and a new randomness for node v. Given a leaf node v, a time t, a randomness s, subroutine LeafChange outputs a fresh public key by invoking the key generation algorithm G of PKE. Table 4 . Five subroutines run by the key authority.
NodeGen((k 0 , · · · , k n ), (td 0 , · · · , td n , s), v ∈ {0, 1} ≤n−1 ∪ {ε}, ): FindNodes(RL, t, KL):
For i = n − 1 to 0: \\ find the ancestors of id ∈ Y.
∀(v, ·, ·) ∈ KL with |v| = i:
NodeChange(k, td, v ∈ {0, 1} ≤n−1 ∪ {ε}, h v||0 , h v||1 , t, s):
LeafChange(v ∈ {0, 1} n , t, s):
Construction of RIBE. Now we describe our revocable IBE scheme (RIBE.Setup, RIBE.KG, RIBE.KU, RIBE.DK, RIBE.Enc, RIBE.Dec, RIBE.R).
• Setup RIBE.Setup(1 λ , 1 n ): given a security parameter λ, an integer n where 2 n is the maximal number of users that the scheme supports. Define identity space as ID = {0, 1} n and time space as T = {0, 1} , and do the following.
Sample s
Initialize key list KL := ∅ , public list PL = ∅, key update list KU = ∅ and revocation list RL := ∅.
4.
mpk := (k 0 , · · · , k n−1 , ); st := {KL, PL, RL, KU}; msk := (mpk, td 0 , · · · , td n−1 , s).
5.
Output (mpk, msk, st).
• Private Key Generation RIBE.KG(msk, id ∈ {0, 1} n , st) : See Figure 4 for illustrations. 
1.
Parse msk = (mpk, td 0 , · · · , td n−1 , s) and mpk = (k 0 , · · · , k n−1 , ).
2.
W
where ε is the empty string.
3.
For
5. st = {KL, PL, RL, KU} and sk id :
Output (sk id , st).
• Key Update Generation RIBE.KU(msk, t, st): See Figure 5 for illustrations. Figure 5 . The illustration of KU (t) when users "000" and "010" have been revoked at time slot t.
1.
Parse msk = (mpk, td 0 , · · · , td n−1 , s) , st = {KL, PL, RL, KU} and mpk = (k 0 , · · · , k n−1 , ).
2.
Y ← FindNodes(RL, t, KL). // Y stores all revoked leaves and their ancestors 3.
If Y = ∅, Output(KU, PL) //stay unchanged.
4.
Set key update list KU (t) := ∅.
5.
For all node v ∈ Y such that |v| = n: // deal with all leaves in Y (ek
For i = n − 1 to 0: // generate new attachments for all non-leaf nodes in Y For all node v ∈ Y and |v| = i:
, t, s).
,r
st := {KL, PL, RL, KU} 9.
Output st.
• Decryption Key Generation RIBE.DK(mpk, sk id , KU, t): See Figure 6 for illustrations. Figure 6 . The illustration of the Decryption Key Generation for user "011" when users "000" and "010" have been revoked at time slot t. For i from 1 to t, the node values along the path from "011" to "ε" in the tree will be replaced by the corresponding node values in KU (i) . The decryption key sk (t) 011 of user "011" collects all the updated node values along the path from "011" to "ε" in the tree.
1.
where ε is the empty string. 2.
Parse mpk= (k 0 , · · · , k n−1 , ) and sk id = (0, id, {h v , h v||0 , h v||1 , r v } v∈W , dk id ).
3.
From KU retrieve a set Ω := {(t, KU (t) ) | (t, KU (t) ) ∈ KU, 0 ≤t < t}.
4.
For each (t, KU (t) ) ∈ Ω witht in ascending order, does the following:
For i = 0 to n − 1:
Output sk
We describe two circuits that will be garbled during the encryption procedure. Encryption proceeds as follows:
For i = n − 1 to 0,
) and set lab := lab .
5.
Output ct := lab
, {P 0 , · · · ,P n−1 ,Q} , where h
ε,j is the j th bit of h
ε .
• Decryption RIBE.Dec(mpk, sk
2.
Parse mpk= (k 0 , · · · , k n−1 , ) and sk
, {P 0 , · · · ,P n−1 ,Q}
4.
Set y := h (t) ε .
5.
, and for each j ∈ [λ],
If i = n − 1, set y := ek id and for each j ∈ [λ], compute
7.
Output m ← D(dk id , f ).
• Revocation RIBE.R(id, t, st):
1.
Parse st := {KL, PL, RL, KU}.
2.
Update the revocation list by RL := RL ∪ {(id, t)}.
3.
st := {KL, PL, RL, KU}.
4.
Remark. It is possible for us to reduce the cost of users' key updating in our construction. Now we provide a more efficient variant of decryption key generation algorithm RIBE.DK'. With this variant algorithm, if a user has already generated a key sk
id at time period t where t ≤ t, he or she can use sk (t ) id as the input instead of sk id and generates the decryption key with lower computational cost. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
Decryption Key Generation RIBE.DK'(mpk, sk
id , KU, t):
2.
If t > t, Output ⊥.
From KU retrieve a set Ω := {(t, KU (t) ) | (t, KU (t) ) ∈ KU, t ≤t < t}.
6.
\\id is revoked att
Correctness
We first show that our revocable IBE is correct. During the time slot t, the key updating algorithm RIBE.KU (together with the key generation algorithm RIBE.KG) uniquely determines a fresh tree of time t. The root of the fresh tree has attachment (h
where ε is the empty string. Please Please note that each id uniquely determines a path (from the root of the tree to the leaf of id). W records all non-leaf nodes on the path. For all nodes v ∈ W, we have
, {P 0 , · · · ,P n ,Q} , which is the output of RIBE.Enc(mpk, id, t, m, PL). Consider the secret key sk
id is exactly the the secret key of id in the tree (of time t). As long as the h (t) used in RIBE.Enc to generate ct is identical to the h
ε ), the decryption RIBE.Dec can always recover the plaintext due to the correctness of the DG scheme.
Below we show the details of the correctness (this analysis is similar to that in [8] ). For all nodes v ∈ W, we have the following facts.
2.
Due to the correctness of the chameleon encryption, we know that given (h
by decrypting
is the label for the next garbled circuitP (|v|+1) .
3.
When |v| = n − 1, we obtain the set of labels lab j,ek id,j j∈ [λ] . selected by ek id . Thus,
Due to the correctness of PKE = (G, E, D), given decryption key dk id , one can always recover the original message m correctly with m ← D(dk id , f ).
Security
In this subsection, we prove that our revocable IBE scheme is IND-ID-CPA secure. Assume q is a polynomial upper bound for the running-time of an adversary A, and it is also an upper bound for the number of A's queries (which contains private key queries, key update queries, and revocation queries).
Theorem 1.
Assume that t max is the size of the time space and 2 n be the maximal number of users. If PRF is a pseudorandomn function, the garbled circuit scheme is secure, the chameleon encryption scheme CE is secure and PKE = (G, E, D) is IND-CPA secure, the above proposed revocable IBE scheme is adaptive-IND-ID-CPA secure (without decryption key exposure resistance) More specificly, for any PPT adversary A issuing at mostueries, there exist PPT adversaries B 1 , B 2 , B 3 and B 4 such that
Proof. The full proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix B.1.
Revocable IBE Scheme with DKER
In this section, we present the construction of revocable IBE scheme with decryption key exposure resistance from the CDH assumption. In [24] , Katsumata et al. provided a generic construction of RIBE scheme with DKER from a hierarchal IBE (HIBE) scheme (the formal definition of HIBE is provided in Appendix A) and a RIBE scheme without DKER. Following this idea, based on the previous RIBE scheme RIBE = (RIBE.Setup, RIBE.KG, RIBE.KU, RIBE.DK, RIBE.Enc, RIBE.Dec, RIBE.R) in Section 4 and a HIBE scheme HIBE = (HIBE.Setup, RIBE.KG, HIBE.Enc, HIBE.Dec) in [8] , both of which are based on the CDH assumption, we can construct a revocable IBE scheme Π with DKER from the CDH assumption.
Let ID, T and M denote identity space, time period space and plaintext space respectively. We assume Π.I D = RIBE.I D and Π.T = RIBE.T . ∀ id ∈ RIBE.I D and ∀ t ∈ RIBE.T , (id||t) ∈ HIBE.I D. In addition, we assume Π.M = RIBE.M = HIBE.M.
Construction of RIBE with DKER. Now we describe our revocable IBE scheme Π = (Setup, KG, KU, DK, Enc, Dec, R) with DKER following [24] .
• Setup(1 λ , 1 n ): given a security parameter λ, an integer n where 2 n is the maximal number of users that the scheme supports, i.e., Π.I D = {0, 1} n . Define the time space as Π.T = {0, 1} .
4.
id , HIBE.sk id||t ).
• Enc(mpk, id, t, m, PL)):
1.
Parse mpk := (RIBE.mpk, HIBE.mpk).
2.
Sample a pair (RIBE.m, HIBE.m) ∈ M 2 uniformly at random, subject to RIBE.m + HIBE.m = m. 3.
Run RIBE.ct ← RIBE.Enc(RIBE.mpk, id, t, RIBE.m, PL).
4.
Run HIBE.ct ← HIBE.Enc(HIBE.mpk, (id||t), HIBE.m).
5.
Output ct := (RIBE.ct, HIBE.ct).
• Dec(mpk, sk
id , ct):
1. 
4.
Output m := RIBE.m + HIBE.m.
• R(id, t, st):
Output st := RIBE.st.
Obviously, the correctness of scheme Π follows from the correctness of the underlying RIBE scheme and HIBE scheme. The security of scheme Π is guaranteed by the following theorem. [24] ) If the underlying RIBE scheme in the above RIBE scheme Π is selective-IND-ID-CPA secure but without decryption key exposure resistance (DKER), and the underlying HIBE scheme in Π is selective-IND-ID-CPA secure, then the resulting RIBE scheme Π is selective-IND-ID-CPA secure with DKER.
Theorem 2. (Theorem 1 in
Please note that our RIBE scheme RIBE in Section 4 is adaptive-IND-ID-CPA secure without DKER and the hierarchal IBE HIBE constructed in [8] is selective-IND-ID-CPA secure. Both of RIBE and HIBE are based on the CDH assumption. Following Theorem 2, the constructed RIBE scheme Π will be selective-IND-ID-CPA secure with DKER based on the CDH assumption.
Corollary 1.
When instantiating the building blocks with our RIBE scheme RIBE in Section 4 and the hierarchal IBE HIBE in [8] , the RIBE scheme Π is selective-IND-ID-CPA secure with DKER based on the CDH assumption.
Server-Aided Revocable IBE Scheme
In this section, we present a server-aided version of our revocable IBE scheme. Following the ideas in Sections 4 and 5, we use a standard HIBE scheme HIBE = (HIBE.Setup, HIBE.KG, HIBE.Enc, HIBE.Dec) in [8] as a building block to construct such a SR-IBE Σ, so that Σ can obtain DKER. To describe our server-aided revocable IBE scheme Σ, we make use of these five subroutines (NodeGen, LeafGen, FindNodes, NodeChange, LeafChange) as defined in Section 4.
Let Σ.I D, Σ.T and Σ.M denote the identity space, the time period space and the plaintext space of scheme Σ respectively. Let HIBE.I D and HIBE.M denote the identity space and the plaintext space of scheme HIBE respectively. For all id ∈ Σ.I D and all t ∈ Σ.T , we assume (id||t) ∈ HIBE.I D.
In addition, we assume Σ.M = HIBE.M.
Idea.
To convert the RIBE scheme Π with DKER in Section 5 to the SR-IBE scheme Σ, the problem is how to divide the decryption ability between the server and the users.
• Key Generation: Recall that in RIBE Π the secret key of a user is (Π.sk id := (RIBE.sk id , HIBE.sk id ).
Moreover, as shown in Figure 2 , the RIBE private key RIBE.sk id can be treated as a path from the root to the leaf corresponding to id in a tree. Now for SR-IBE Σ, we divide the RIBE private key RIBE.sk id into two parts, the non-leaf part and the leaf part. The non-leaf part (we name it pk id ) is assigned to the server and the leaf part (ek id , dk id ) (in fact dk id is enough) to user id. Besides, user id is also assigned with the HIBE private key HIBE.sk id . This is shown in Figure 7 . Figure 7 . Separation of Π.sk 111 to the server and the user "111" in SR-IBE Σ, where pk 111 is the public key and sk 111 is the private key of user "111".
• Key Update: If a user has been revoked in RIBE Π, the updating information in the leaf node corresponding to the user will not be issued. In other words, all the key updating information only occurs in the upper part of the tree excluding the leaves. Therefore, in SR-IBE Σ the key authority can issue the key updating list to the server and the server is in charge of updating keys for users.
• Decryption: Recall that in the RIBE scheme Π with DKER in Section 5, the ciphertext consists of two parts: the ciphertext of the RIBE scheme RIBE.ct and the ciphertext of the HIBE scheme HIBE.ct. To decrypt RIBE.ct in SR-IBE Σ, the decryption is implemented from the top to the bottom along the path in the tree. The server will decrypt the upper non-leaf part while the user will decrypt the leaf part. Meanwhile, the user is alway able to use HIBE.sk id and time slot t to compute HIBE.sk id||t and decrypt HIBE.ct with it. The process is shown in Figure 8 . Construction of SR-IBE. Now we describe our server-aided revocable IBE scheme Σ = (Setup, PubKG, KU, TranKG, PrivKG, DK, Enc, Transform, Dec, R).
• Setup(1 λ , 1 n ): given a security parameter λ, an integer n where 2 n is the maximal number of users that the scheme supports. Define identity space as Σ.I D = {0, 1} n and time space as Σ.T = {0, 1} , and do the following.
Sample s
4.
Run (HIBE.mpk, HIBE.msk) ← HIBE.Setup(1 λ ).
5.
mpk := (k 0 , · · · , k n−1 , , HIBE.mpk); st := {KL, PL, RL, KU}; msk := (mpk, td 0 , · · · , td n−1 , s, HIBE.msk).
6.
• PubKG(msk, id ∈ {0, 1} n , st)
1.
Parse msk = (mpk, td 0 , · · · , td n−1 , s, HIBE.msk), st = {KL, PL, RL, KU} and mpk = (k 0 , · · · , k n−1 , , HIBE.mpk).
2.
5. st = {KL, PL, RL, KU} and pk id := (t = 0, id, {lk v } v∈W ). 6 .
Output (pk id , st). // This algorithm is almost the same as the Private Key Generation algorithm in Section 4 except that there is no dk id in pk id .
• KU(msk, t, st):
If Y = ∅, Output(KU, PL)
4.
5.
For all node v ∈ Y such that |v| = n: (ek
For i = n − 1 to 0: For all node v ∈ Y and |v| = i:
,r (t) v )}.
7.
KU := KU ∪ {(t, KU (t) )} and PL := PL ∪ {(t, h (t) ε )}. 8 .
Output (st). // This algorithm is identical to the Key Update Generation algorithm in Section 4.
• TranKG(mpk, pk id , KU):
Parse mpk = (k 0 , · · · , k n−1 , , HIBE.mpk) and pk id = (0, id, {h v , h v||0 , h v||1 , r v } v∈W ).
3.
4.
, r (t) v ).
Output tk (t)
id := (t, id, {lk
v } v∈W ) // This algorithm is almost the same as the Decryption Key Generation algorithm in Section 4 except that all update operations do not involve leaf nodes, i.e., dk id .
• PrivKG(msk, id ∈ {0, 1} n )
1.
Parse msk = (mpk, td 0 , · · · , td n−1 , s, HIBE.msk) and mpk = (k 0 , · · · , k n−1 , , HIBE.mpk).
2.
(
Run HIBE.sk id ← HIBE.KG(HIBE.msk, id).
4.
6.
Compute f ← Eval(Q, {lab j,y j } j∈[λ] ).
7.
Output ct := ( f , HIBE.ct) // This algorithm is almost the same as the Decryption algorithm in Section 4 except that this algorithm omits the last step, i.e., it does not recover RIBE.m from f .
• Dec(mpk, dk
Obviously, the correctness of this scheme Σ follows from the correctness of the RIBE scheme described in Section 4 and the HIBE scheme used as the building block. The security of scheme Σ is guaranteed by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.
If HIBE is the hierarchal IBE constructed in [8] , the above server-aided revocable IBE scheme Σ is selective-SR-ID-CPA secure (with decryption key exposure resistance ) based on the CDH assumption.
Proof. The full proof of Theorem 3 is in Appendix B.2.
Analysis of Key Updating Size
In this section, we analyze the key updating efficiency of our revocable IBE scheme. Different from an IBE scheme, a revocable IBE scheme has enormous cost on the publishing updating keys at each time slot. In our RIBE, the number of updating keys is linear to the number of updated nodes. Therefore, we focus on the number of updated nodes for the performance. The advantage of our RIBE lies in the fact that the nodes that needs to updated is only related to the number ∆r of newly revoked users in the past time slot. More precisely, in all the three schemes proposed in this paper, the number of nodes needs to be updated in each time plot is at most ∆r(log N − log(∆r)). Thus the key updating size of our scheme is at most O(∆r(log N − log(∆r))). If there is no new users revoked in the previous time slot, then key updating is not necessary at all.
Recall that in the most of RIBE schemes, the size of updating keys is closely related to the total number r of all the revoked users across all the past slots. For example, in [10] the size of updated key during each time slot is of order O(r log (N/r)), where N is the number of users. In addition, in [14] , the size of updated key during each time slot is of order O(r).
For simulation, we use Poisson distribution to simulate the number of revoked users at each time period, where α denotes the expected number of revoked users in each time slot. At a time slot t, we sample a random number ∆r t following the Poisson distribution parameterized by α, and ∆r t denotes the number of revoked users at time slot t. The total number r t of the revoked users up to time slot t is given by ∑ t t=0 ∆r t . We evaluate the key updating sizes in our RIBE, the RIBE in [10] and the RIBE in [14] . Since all the our three schemes share the same updating complexity in each time plot, we only simulate our RIBE scheme without DKER and compare the results with the RIBE scheme in [10] and the RIBE scheme in [14] . The simulation results for N = 2 20 and N = 2 25 are shown in Figures 9 and 10 respectively. The experiment has the following requirements for A.
• The two plaintexts submitted by A have the same length, i.e., |m 0 | = |m 1 |.
• If A has queried id to oracle HIBE.KG(·), then id cannot be the a prefix of id * .
A hierarchical IBE scheme is selective-IND-ID-CPA secure if for all PPT adversary A, the following advantage is negligible in the security parameter λ, i.e., 
Combining (A1), (A2), (A11), (A12), (A18) and (A19), we have
